Procedural Fairness and Enforcement System under the Antimonopoly Act of Japan by KURITA Makoto
I. Introduction
This essay provides critical views on procedural fairness and enforcement 
system under the Antimonopoly Act of Japan （AMA） from a Japanese 
scholar’s perspective＊. I used to work at the staff office of Japan Fair Trade 
Commission （JFTC） from 1977 to 2001, and nearly 20 years academic life 
has made me rather dissenting to the enforcement system and the JFTC’s 
practices under the AMA 1 .
Both enforcers and scholars of competition law tend to focus on 
substantive issues rather than procedural ones. Nor had I been interested 
in procedure while I was at the JFTC, except during the last 3 years serving 
as a hearing examiner （a kind of administrative law judge）. After my 
＊This essay is based on the text of my presentation, titled as “Procedural Fairness and 
Enforcement System --A Japanese Scholar’s Perspective,” at Break-out Session （1） 
on “Convergences: Problems and potential improvements in antitrust/competition 
proceedings in Asia,” Asia Competition Association （ACA） Annual Conference, October 
19, 2019, held at Gwangbok Hall Annex, Yonsei University Law School, Seoul, Korea. 
The ACA, established in September 2008, is a non-governmental forum for exchanging 
and sharing views and experiences on competition law and policy among academics and 
practitioners in Japan, Korea, and China.
 1 　After my departure from the JFTC, the enforcement procedures under the AMA have 
been drastically changed during the last 15 years. I am not a qualified lawyer and have no 
experience in practices before the JFTC. Therefore, my views here are solely based on 
my theoretical examinations.
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transfer to academic circle in 2001, the AMA has been frequently amended 
to strengthen sanction against violations and “improve” enforcement 
procedure. A large portion of my scholarship has been devoted to procedural 
and enforcement issues 2 .
There have been growing interests in procedural issues among 
competition communities all over the world in recent years 3 . The most 
striking development in competition law during the last 30 years is the 
proliferation of competition laws and competition authorities around the 
world, particularly in developing countries. Differences not only in substance 
but also in procedure among various competition law regimes impose heavy 
burdens and costs on businesses, and insuf ficient procedural fairness 
allegedly have frustrated level-playing fields in international markets, 
although such allegations may have been a mere reflection of diversities in 
enforcement systems and procedures among jurisdictions.
The U.S. competition authorities, particularly the Department of Justice 
（DOJ）, have strongly advocated procedural fairness in competition law 
enforcement at various fora, including OECD and International Competition 
Network （ICN） 4 . Competition Committee of OECD has a long history 
 2 　See Makoto Kurita, Effectiveness and Transparency of Competition Law Enforcement 
--Causes and Consequences of A Perception Gap between Home and Abroad on the Anti-
Monopoly Act Enforcement in Japan, 3 Wash. U. Global Stud L. Rev. 387 （2004）; Makoto 
Kurita, Impediments to Effective Enforcement of Competition Law--Institutional Flaws in the 
Antimonopoly Act of Japan and Its Enforcement, Hokkaido Journal of New Global Law and 
Policy, vol. 10, 71 （2011）.
 3 　See generally Paul Nihoul and Tadeusz Skoczny, eds., Procedural Fairness in Competition 
Proceedings （ASCOLA Competition Law Series）, Edward Elgar, 2015; D. Daniel Sokol and 
Andrew T. Guzman, eds., Antitrust Procedural Fairness, Oxford University Press, 2019.
 4 　See e.g., Makan Delrahim, Fresh Thinking on Procedural Fairness: A Multilateral 
Framework on Procedures in Antitrust Enforcement, June 1, 2018. Assistant Attorney 
General Delrahim’s proposal in this speech served as a foundation for the ICN CAP to be 
mentioned next.
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to address procedural issues 5  and is now reportedly preparing the draft 
Recommendation on Transparency and Procedural Fairness in Competition 
Law Enforcement 6 . The ICN launched the Framework on Competition 
Agency Procedures （CAP） 7  and adopted Recommended Practices for 
Investigative Process in April 2019.
This essay examines enforcement system under the AMA, focusing on non-
merger conduct cases （typically unilateral or single-firm conduct）, from a 
viewpoint of improving effectiveness and integrity of competition authorities. 
More specifically, two issues are to be examined: one is insuf ficient 
procedural fairness and transparency in the JFTC’s investigation practices 
and decision process, and the other is frequent utilization of informal 
measures by the JFTC. Organizational issue is also referred to briefly.
II. Procedural Fairness and Transparency
1. Classification of Competition Cases and Enforcement Practices
Before examining procedures, let me begin with some classifications of 
 5 　See e.g., OECD, Procedural Fairness and Transparency: Key Points, 2012.
 6 　Christopher S. Yoo, Due Process in International Antitrust Enforcement: An Idea Whose 
Time has Come, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, September 2019, at 26.
 7 　The CAP is designed to strengthen procedural fairness in competition law enforcement. 
Although the CAP is non-binding, by joining the CAP each Participant agrees that it 
intends in good faith to adhere to the framework to the extent consistent with applicable 
laws. Participation in the ICN CAP obliges agencies to complete a template outlining 
how each participant complies with the procedural fairness and transparency and CAP 
templates are to be published on the ICN website. The template of the JFTC, a founding 
member to the CAP, regrettably is not found as of June 1, 2020. The CAP contains 
“cooperation process” and “review process” and the JFTC may have to respond to the 
requests of dialogues from other participating agencies. The more the JFTC would take 
actions against foreign firms in the future, the more bilateral reviews, dialogues, and 
consultations on procedural issues under the CAP, bilateral cooperation agreements, or 
competition chapter of FTA/EPAs would take place.
Procedural Fairness and Enforcement System under the Antimonopoly Act of Japan（KURITA） 17
competition cases. Competition cases can be classified into merger cases and 
non-merger cases. Competition law usually provides prior notification system 
for mergers which exceed certain thresholds and develops merger-specific 
investigation procedures and practices. Among non-merger cases, hard-core 
cartel cases can be treated differently because of their characteristics such 
as heavy sanction including criminal penalties, strong investigative power, 
and leniency system. The examination hereinafter will focus on non-merger 
civil conduct cases in the U.S. terminology 8 .
Competition authorities are “law enforcement” agencies, which investigate 
and prosecute alleged violation cases. Law enforcement, however, is not 
the only measure to realize or fulfil the goals of competition law. Various 
measures, including education and advocacy, are ver y impor tant. In 
Japan, non-legal （or non-enforcement） measures, such as promulgation of 
guidelines, response to prior consultations from businesses, fact-finding 
survey and guidance based thereon, have been frequently employed and 
utilized by the JFTC to secure compliance with the AMA, in addition to, 
and sometimes in lieu of, law enforcement 9 . The JFTC may employ non-
legal measures to address competition problems without resorting to 
legal measures, that is, a series of procedures for detection, investigation, 
prosecution, adjudication, and order.
2. Actual Situation of the JFTC’s Practices to Handle the AMA Cases
The table below indicates the actual practices by the JFTC to address the AMA 
violation cases. It roughly summarizes what kinds of measures the JFTC to take 
 8 　Under the AMA, non-merger civil conduct cases are investigated from a viewpoint of 
“unfair trade practices” or “private monopolization” in case of single-firm conduct, and 
“unreasonable restraint of trade” or trade association activities in case of joint conduct.
 9 　See Kurita, Impediments to Effective Enforcement of Competition Law, supra note 2.
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* These include self-controlling and exclusionary activities by trade associations. Under 
Article 8 of the AMA, activities of trade associations are more strictly regulated, compared 
to joint activities by entrepreneurs.
** These are mainly vertical restraints, exclusionary practices, and abuses of superior 
bargaining position. Provided, abuse cases were handled by means of legal measures 
（cease-and-desist order and surcharge payment order） in a certain past period. Non-
hardcore cartels have been rarely handled as investigation cases.
*** Strictly speaking, merger cases are not investigation cases.
+ The JFTC sometimes issues “warning” to respondents in non-merger conduct cases, and 
warnings are usually made public.
++ Commitment procedure, which is not applicable to hardcore cartel cases, was introduced 
in December 2018 and there are two commitment cases as of June 1, 2020. Discontinuance of 
investigation and publication may not be employed after the introduction of commitment procedure.
Concerning merger cases, the JFTC has not resorted to legal measures to 
 10 　Under the AMA, illegal conduct must satisfy both conduct requirement and effect 
requirement. Hardcore car tels, however, almost always have adverse ef fect on 
competition in relevant market, and if an alleged hardcore cartel could satisfy conduct 
requirement, it would usually satisfy effect requirement. In this sense hardcore cartels 
are illegal in principle under the AMA, if not illegal per se.
Procedural Fairness and Enforcement System under the Antimonopoly Act of Japan（KURITA） 19
address problematic merger plans for nearly 50 years 11 . Without resorting 
to formal investigation procedure 12 , the JFTC examines notified merger 
cases and if necessary, explains its competitive concerns to the merging 
parties （filing company）. The filing company usually proposes its remedy 
plan to the JFTC 13  and if admitted by the JFTC, adds the remedy plan in its 
notification file. The JFTC finally informs the filing company of its intention 
not to issue cease-and-desist order and then the case is closed 14 . The JFTC 
publicizes the summary of the merger cases in each time or annually.
As far as hardcore cartel cases are concerned, the JFTC appears to have 
an established firm policy to take formal actions and if proved with adequate 
evidences, to issue cease-and-desist orders and surcharge payment orders.
Concerning non-merger civil conduct cases, the JFTC sometimes initiates 
formal investigations but rarely takes formal actions. As far as non-merger 
civil conduct cases are concerned, the JFTC issues only 1 or 2 cease-and-
desist orders annually 15 . Written orders provide facts on conduct committed 
 11 　The last formal decision by the JFTC on merger case is Hiroshima Electric Railway 
case, JFTC Consent Decision, July 17, 1973, 20 Shinketsu-shu 62.
 12 　Inside the General Secretariat of the JFTC, merger cases are handled by Mergers and 
Acquisitions Division of Economic Affairs Bureau, not Investigation Bureau.
 13 　The filing company may decline to implement the merger plans and withdraw the 
merger filing.
 14 　If the merging parties would not implement the remedy plan as promised, the JFTC could 
resume its investigation and issue cease-and-desist order under Article 10 (9) of the AMA.
 15 　The following table indicates the numbers of cease-and-desist orders rendered by the 
JFTC during the last 5 years （FY2015-2019）.
Types of conduct 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Total
Hardcore cartel 7 9 11 7 9 43
Resale price maintenance 0 1 0 0 2 3
Restrictive or exclusive trading 0 1 0 0 0 1
Obstruction of competitor’s transaction 0 0 0 1 0 1
Abuse of superior bargaining position 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other types of unfair trade practices 0 0 1 0 0 1
Trade association activities 2 0 1 0 0 3
Total 9 11 13 8 11 52
（Source: FY2018 Annual Report of the JFTC and other press releases）
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by the respondents briefly, but not theories of competitive harm caused by 
the conduct. Many non-merger civil conduct cases are closed by issuing 
“warning” to the respondents 16 . Some cases are closed and published after 
the respondents take or express their intention to take voluntary remedial 
measures 17 . The recent amendment of the AMA introduced “commitment 
procedure” and the JFTC published the first commitment case concerning 
so-called MFN （most-favored nation） or parity clauses employed by 
Rakuten, online accommodation reservation system operator 18 . While the 
JFTC indicated its positive attitude to explain competitive effects of alleged 
practices 19 , the press rereleases on Rakuten and Nihon Medi-Physics cases 
remain silent.
It is quite strange that while the publications on closed cases included 
some explanations on alleged theories of competitive harm 20 , formal written 
cease-and desist orders have almost no such description. The JFTC practices 
appear to be upside-down. The JFTC’s investigators probably explain 
their theories of competitive harm to the respondents during pre-hearing 
procedure and the JFTC has the burden to prove them before the court. 
The current practice not describing theories of competitive harm in written 
cease-and-desist orders may infringe upon the right of respondents to an 
 16 　Warnings are issued in cases where the JFTC could not obtain adequate evidences to 
prove violations in non-merger conduct cases.
 17 　Recent typical cases are Amazon Japan case （published on June 1, 2017） and Airbnb 
case （published on October 10, 2018）. In Amazon Japan case so-called parity clauses 
were alleged to fall under unfair trade practices （restrictive trading） under the AMA and 
in Airbnb case exclusive conditions were alleged to fall under private monopolization or 
unfair trade practices （exclusive or restrictive trading） under the AMA.
 18 　Approval of commitment plan submitted by Rakuten, Inc. （October 25, 2019）. The 
JFTC approved the second commitment plan submitted by Nihon Medi-Physics on March 
11, 2020, after nearly two years investigation of alleged private monopolization case.
 19 　JFTC, Policies concerning Commitment Procedures, September 26, 2018, at 11.
 20 　See, e.g., Amazon Japan and Airbnb cases, supra note 17.
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adequate statement of reasons 21 .
3. Investigation Cases under Formal Procedure
When discussing about procedural fairness, we usually pay attention to 
formal investigation, prosecution, adjudication, and order under respective 
competition laws. In case of hardcore cartels, on which any competition 
authorities put the highest priority and impose heavy penalties if proved, 
procedural fairness must be all the more secured to protect the right of 
defense for respondents and to improve integrity and ef fectiveness for 
competition authorities.
In many jurisdictions, including Japan, procedural fairness and 
transparency of competition law enforcement have been improving by 
way of amendment of respective laws and regulations, internal guidelines 
and practices, staff trainings, and so on. As far as advanced jurisdictions 
are concerned, enforcement process under competition laws, that is, 
investigation, prior-hearing or administrative adjudication, decision, and 
judicial review, is not so much different. According to a report prepared 
 21 　According to Article 61(1) of the AMA, “A cease-and-desist order must be rendered 
in writing, and the written cease-and-desist order is to indicate the measures necessary 
to eliminate the violation or to ensure that the violation is eliminated, and the facts found 
by the Fair Trade Commission and the application of laws and regulations thereto.” This 
provision is the same as was the case with the so-called recommendation decision under 
Article 48(3) and 57(1) of the AMA prior to its 2005 amendment, and the JFTC may 
interpret that the provision does not require the JFTC to describe theories of competitive 
harm caused by the conduct found by the JFTC. This interpretation is flawed. Cease-
and-desist orders under the current AMA are different from recommendation decisions 
which were based on the voluntary acceptance by the respondents to take measures 
recommended by the JFTC. Article 14(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act （APA） 
requires the administrative agencies to show the ground for the adverse disposition, and 
the JFTC’s interpretation of Article 61(1) of the AMA may be contrary to the spirit of the 
APA, which is not applicable to the JFTC investigation procedure.
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by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, many procedural fairness “problems” 
are attributed to “too much variation between case handlers”, rather than 
existing （or lacking） procedural statutes and regulations 22 .
In case of the JFTC, however, much remains to be done with its own 
efforts. Based on its rule-making authority under Article 76(1) of the AMA, 
the JFTC should take measures in order to firmly secure procedural fairness 
and transparency during formal enforcement process. One is to establish 
procedural safeguards to resolve procedural disputes between respondents 
and investigators during investigation stage by means of appointing impartial 
officer such as hearing examiner under EU competition law. The other is to 
improve existing pre-hearing procedure and provide in written orders, issues 
raised by respondents and conclusions thereon with detailed reasons.
4. Procedural Amendments of the AMA
During the last 15 years, the enforcement procedure under the AMA has 
been drastically changed. The AMA had adopted quasi-judicial administrative 
hearing procedure since its enactment in 1947. The 2005 amendment 
（effective January 2006） employed post-decision hearing system and this 
amendment ignited the critical views on administrative hearing by the JFTC, 
which allegedly held dual functions in the criminal justice system, that is, 
prosecutor and judge. The 2013 amendment （effective April 2015） flatly 
abolished administrative hearing system 23 . Under the current procedure, 
the JFTC renders its final order after pre-hearing of opinions from each 
 22 　Paul O’Brien, Procedural Fairness: Convergence in Progress, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, 
November 2018, at 12 （citing U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Adherence to ICN Guidance 
on Investigative Process: A Practitioners’ Survey （2017）, at 11）.
 23 　As of June 1, 2020, several administrative hearing cases are still pending as a 
transitional measure.
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respondent and the respondent may file administrative lawsuit with the Tokyo 
District Court （TDC） to quash the order. In addition, the 2016 amendment 
introduced commitment procedure （effective December 30, 2018）.
Under the current procedure and practices, the JFTC serves draft order to 
each respondent and a hearing officer designated by the JFTC, holds simple 
pre-hearing of opinions from the respondent, and the JFTC renders its final 
cease-and-desist order after examining a report from the hearing officer. 
The respondent may file a lawsuit with the TDC under the Administrative 
Case Litigation Act. There are almost no differences from judicial reviews of 
ordinary administrative dispositions by ordinary administrative agencies 24 .
To sum up, the 2013 amendment of the AMA can be characterized as 
changing the AMA- or JFTC-specific deliberate procedure to average or 
ordinary administrative procedure under the Japanese administrative law 
system. From my viewpoint, that is the problem and the AMA and the JFTC 
shall be something special.
I am not so familiar with the JFTC’s current practices, but it appears to me 
that pre-hearings of opinions have not been functioning well for respondents. 
The pre-hearing procedure may provide an opportunity for investigators 
to find and reinforce weak points in fact-findings and applications of laws 
in draft orders and support investigators and finally the JFTC 25 . Written 
 24 　Provided, the TDC has exclusive jurisdiction over such lawsuits （Article 85 of the 
AMA）.
 25 　A typical example is Tosa-Aki Agricultural Cooperative unfair trade practice case 
（cease-and-desist order, March 27, 2017 ［restrictive trading］）. After the first pre-hearing 
of opinions from the respondent, the JFTC conducted on-the-spot investigation again and 
issued the cease-and-desist order with changes in fact-findings and application of laws 
from the first draft order, after the second pre-hearing. The respondent argued procedural 
issues in its lawsuit to quash the order before the TDC, but the TDC dismissed the 
argument （TDC Judgment, March 28, 2019; Tokyo High Court Judgement, November 
27, 2019 ［dismissal］）.
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orders by the JFTC provide no conclusions nor reasons on issues raised by 
respondents at pre-hearings of opinions.
Up to now, there are several judgements by the TDC under the new 
procedure, and most of these judgements have confirmed the JFTC’s 
orders 26 . The abolished administrative hearing procedure had been allegedly 
notorious for taking a long period of time. Expeditious case handling may be a 
positive effect of the current procedure. From my viewpoint, the JFTC should 
have made efforts to streamline and expedite the pre-decision administrative 
hearing procedure under the AMA prior to its 2005 amendment.
III. Informal Measures by the JFTC
1. Various Informal Measures Employed by the JFTC
In addition to formal enforcement measures under the AMA, the JFTC 
frequently utilizes informal measures to realize or fulfil the goals of the 
AMA. Informal or “soft” measures include promulgation of guidelines, 
response to prior consultations from businesses, and fact-finding surveys 
and guidance based thereon. These measures are important particularly in 
case of non-merger civil conduct （vertical restraints, exclusionary practices, 
and exploitative practices as well as non-hardcore cartels）.
The informal tools are not necessarily institutionalized under the AMA. For 
example, some competition laws provide the legal tool or power for competition 
authorities to conduct sector inquiries or market studies 27 . Developing 
procedure for market studies would contribute to improve effectiveness of such 
 26 　In tantalum electrolytic capacitor price-fixing case, the TDC judgement （March 28, 
2019） quashed the order to one plaintiff.
 27 　See e.g., Article 17, COUNCIL REGULATION （EC） No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 
on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the 
Treaty; Part 4, Enterprise Act 2002 of the United Kingdom.
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tool and to protect procedural rights for parties concerned 28 .
During fact-finding surveys, the JFTC examines the market and practices 
therein under review, from viewpoints of not only whether “illegal or not” 
under the AMA but also whether “problematic or not” from perspectives 
of the spirit of the AMA and competition policy. Competition policy 
perspectives are quite ambiguous, discretionary, and sometimes capricious, 
and more clarifications and detailed explanations are required. It sometimes 
appears that these informal measures might be employed in lieu of formal 
investigation and prosecution. The JFTC should resort more to formal 
investigation into non-merger conduct cases.
Newly introduced commitment procedure might also be utilized for the 
purpose of avoiding the issuance of formal cease-and-desist orders. Under the 
mandatory administrative surcharge system, the JFTC shall issue surcharge 
payment orders to respondents in violation of private monopolization and 
abuse of superior bargaining position. Commitment procedure enables the 
JFTC to require respondents to take remedial measures without accompanying 
surcharge payment orders 29 . Furthermore, commitment procedure under the 
AMA has various flaws and legislative solution must be explored 30 .
2. Side Effects of Informal Measures by the JFTC
Utilization of informal measures by the JFTC may be quite efficient and 
 28 　For example, the JFTC almost always issues voluntary information requests to parties 
concerned during its surveys. Formal information submission orders under market study 
procedure would improve response rate and accuracy of the information provided by the 
addressees.
 29 　It is reasonable to presume the JFTC to have approved the commitment plan by Nihon 
Medi-Physics in order to avoid the imposition of surcharge.
 30 　 As is frequently criticized, the most serious flaw in commitment procedure under the 
AMA is no sanction against non-compliance by a respondent with its commitment plan. 
The JFTC can only reopen its investigation against the respondent.
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cost-effective in a sense to prevent and resolve competitive concerns and 
problems expeditiously. These informal measures, however, may have 
serious adverse side effects.
Various guidelines promulgated by the JFTC are sometimes ambiguous 
and do not necessarily provide clear guidance to businesses. The JFTC 
guidelines frequently characterize various types of business activities as 
“problematic” under certain conditions. The businesses might mistakenly 
understand that these practices are, in principle prohibited under the 
guidelines. The JFTC may exert influence on business activities by means of 
promulgating guidelines with strict or ambiguous languages.
The responses by the JFTC to prior consultations from businesses are usually 
“conservative”, which means very cautious toward false negative. Even though a 
response from the JFTC indicates that a business plan under consultation would 
be problematic, the applicant for the consultation should carefully examine the 
response, otherwise the applicant might be forced to abandon the business plan, 
which might be competitively neutral or even pro-competitive.
The JFTC’s recent activities by means of various informal measures can be 
called as “verbal intervention”, and the activities might sometimes be based 
on a provision of “abuse of superior bargaining position” （ASBP） under the 
AMA 31  32 . This provision is the ultimate catch-all provision concerning single-
firm conduct. There is almost no limitation on conduct requirement, and 
 31 　See generally, Masako Wakui and Thomas K. Chen, Regulating abuse of superior 
bargaining position under the Japanese competition law: an anomaly or a necessity, 3 J. 
Antitrust Enforcement 302 （2015）; Tadashi Shiraishi, The Exploitative Abuse Prohibition: 
Activated by Modern Issues, 62 Antitrust Bulletin 737 （2017）.
 32 　The JFTC recently promulgated and published its “Guidelines concerning Abuse 
of a Superior Bargaining Position in Transactions between Digital Platform Operators 
and Consumers that Provide Personal Information, etc.” （December 17, 2019）. The 
Guidelines address such practices by dominant digital platform operators that would be 
examined as abuses of dominant position under EU-type competition laws.
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no requirement of adverse effect on market competition. If found illegal as 
ASBP, administrative surcharge shall be imposed on the offender.
IV. Organization and Independence of the JFTC
Many commentators share the view that under the Abe Administration 
policymaking and implementation in ministries and agencies have been more 
and more initiated and controlled by the Prime Minister’s Office （PMO）. 
The JFTC is no exception. While Article 28 of the AMA provides that the 
members of the Commission shall exercise their authority independently, 
the independence may be jeopardized.
Chairman of the JFTC has been invited more frequently than before 
to attend or become a member of minister-level meetings. The PMO 
establishes and presides over various inter-ministerial meetings, requests 
ministries and agencies, including the JFTC, to cooperate and coordinate 
among them, and instructs them to take policy measures hastily without 
deliberate examinations. Ministries and agencies may be easy to contact with 
the JFTC on its informal activities, compared to on its investigation cases. 
On the one hand, ministries and agencies sometimes refer to competition 
problems in order to justify their policy measures, such as the elimination 
of low-price sales of alcoholic beverages and gasoline, alleging unjust low-
price selling under the AMA 33 . On the other hand, ministries and agencies 
argue for exemption from or special treatment under the AMA in order 
to implement their policy measures, such as the promotion of local bank 
mergers and local bus reorganizations 34 . It appears to me that the AMA and 
 33 　The JFTC has long established its office in charge of expeditious investigation on alleged 
low-price selling cases, and the office is called as Fair Competition Inspection Office.
 34 　The Government submitted a bill to the Diet in March 2020 to introduce the AMA 
exemption systems for local bank merger plans and local bus reorganization plans. The 
bill was approved by the Diet on May 20, 2020.
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the JFTC might be deemed as a policy tool for ministries and agencies or the 
Administration of the time.
We can see similar situations in major jurisdictions. To mention a few, in 
the U.S. the recent initiation of investigations by the Antitrust Division of 
the DOJ vis-à-vis automobile companies in California might be influenced 
by the Trump Administration 35 . The Korean Fair Trade Commission, 
ministerial-level organization, is very powerful, but at the same time may be 
vulnerable to political influences from the President or its staff. The State 
Administration for Market Regulation of China is under the Party system in 
China and its independence has been called into question. Merger regulation 
by the European Commission has been criticized by France and Germany 
from an industrial policy viewpoint 36 .
V. Conclusion
Competition authorities around the world usually give the highest 
priority to law enforcement activities, that is, investigation, prosecution, and 
adjudication of alleged violation cases. The same is true of the JFTC as far 
as hardcore cartels are concerned. In case of other types of conduct and 
merger cases, however, the JFTC frequently utilizes informal measures to 
resolve competitive concerns and problems. In case of mergers, the JFTC 
has never rendered cease-and-desist order for almost 50 years, and in case 
 35 　Grant Petrosyan, DOJ’s Probe into Four Automakers: Impartial Investigation or 
Politicization of Antitrust?, CPI’s North America Column, October 2019. The DOJ 
reportedly closed its investigation of the case in February 2020.
 36 　In response to the prohibition decision by the Commission on Case M. 8677, Siemens/
Alstom, Economic Ministers in Germany and France, on February 19, 2019, jointly issued 
a manifesto for a European industrial policy, which proposed to give the Council a veto 
over the Commission’s merger decisions. See A Franco-German Manifesto for a European 
industrial policy fit for the 21st Century.
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of single-firm conduct, the JFTC has rarely taken legal actions, except resale 
price maintenance cases. Recent introduction of commitment procedure, 
which institutionalized informal settlement with respondents, might be a 
bright sign to improve transparency, but we should bear in mind that even 
consent procedures in the U.S. and commitment procedure in EU have 
sometimes been criticized as regulatory and discretionary intervention.
What can be done to improve the AMA and its enforcement? I would like 
to propose several initiatives to be taken by the JFTC without legislative 
actions.
One is to resort more to and improving law enforcement activities. The 
JFTC should vigorously initiate formal investigations vis-à-vis various types 
of alleged violation cases, not just hardcore cartel cases. Procedural disputes 
between respondents and other parties concerned and investigators during 
investigation stage should be resolved expeditiously by an impartial arbiter. 
Pre-hearings of opinions from respondents should be activated, and written 
cease-and-desist orders should include clear and reasoned conclusions on 
issues raised by the respondents during pre-hearing procedure. Approvals 
of commitment plans should accompany explanations of the alleged 
competitive harms, depending on respective cases.
The other is to institutionalize informal measures more clearly and solidly 
in the AMA. Legal basis of fact-finding surveys and guidance based thereon 
should be provided in the JFTC’s rules under Article 76 of the AMA. 
Ambiguous guidelines should be revised in order to provide more clearly 
theories of competitive harm and analytical methods of anticompetitive 
effects, instead of form-based classifications of various business practices. 
The JFTC frequently refers to “problematic from the AMA and competition 
policy viewpoints”, in its publications on informal measures. It is not so clear 
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what is “problematic” and why it is “problematic”. The JFTC should make 
efforts to describe them more clearly and legally in its documents.
 （本学法学部教授）
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